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Abstract
In this paper I argue that the Heidegger of Being and Time is a dialogist, 
and ought to be situated in the tradition of other twentieth-century 
dialogists like Bakhtin and Gadamer. Specifically, I claim that Heidegger’s 
conceptions of the “Being-with,” “discourse,” and “solicitude” of Dasein 
in BT illustrate his endorsement of a conception of dialogicality. There 
are three advantages to proposing that Heidegger is a dialogist in BT. 
First, this paradigm offers a more perspicuous vocabulary for describing 
the discursive nature of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world as a Being-with 
others. Second, it provides a better way of understanding the normative 
dimensions of “solicitude.” Lastly, it helps to underscore how Dasein’s 




In this paper I shall show how Heidegger’s notions of Dasein’s “Being-
with” (Mitsein), “discourse” (Rede), and “solicitude” (Fursorge) illustrate 
how he has a conception of the dialogical in Being and Time. For my 
purposes here, the dialogical involves the following characteristics: 1) it 
is descriptive of discourse; 2) it requires the participation of at least one 
(embodied) person or agent; 3) given (2), it must be understood in terms 
of spatial metaphors or analogues; 4) it is inherently unfinalizable or 
open-ended; 5) it entails address and responsibility; 6) it has a normative 
dimension; and lastly, 7) it involves a to-and-fro movement inherent to 
interlocution. Importantly, the dialogical is not reducible to actual dia-
logue (i.e., conversation), for, as I shall show, the dialogical identifies the 
dynamics which obtain in actual dialogues and, by way of extrapolation, 
ascribes the characteristics of such dynamics to being itself.
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There are at least three advantages to proposing that Heidegger is a 
dialogist in Being and Time. First, this paradigm offers an alternative, 
and more perspicuous, vocabulary for describing the discursive nature of 
Dasein’s Being-in-the-world as a Being-with others. Second, it provides a 
better way of recognizing and understanding the normative dimensions 
of “solicitude.” And third, it helps to underscore the ineliminable social-
ity of Dasein’s understanding of itself and of others, such that its identity 
remains social even in the seemingly individualizing initial moment of 
becoming authentic. 
A Brief Sketch of Dasein’s Being-in-the-World
But before I attempt to show how Heidegger is a dialogist in Being and 
Time, it will be helpful to sketch briefly some of the basic features of 
his project therein. As is well known, Heidegger explicitly rejects the 
Cartesian metaphysical view of the self as a “thinking substance” (res 
cogitans), which exists separately, and is utterly distinct, from a suppos-
edly independently existing external world of objects.1 For Heidegger, 
the Cartesian self-world distinction neglects the fact that the human self 
always finds itself already immersed within a world, not as a self-enclosed 
‘ego’ standing over and against an ‘external’ world of extended objects 
whose ‘true objective’ nature the ‘ego’ is burdened with trying to access 
through an act of pure cogitation. (Thus Descartes’s strenuous attempts 
to prove (metaphysically) how the self as ‘subject’ can ever obtain (epis-
temologically) indubitable knowledge of both itself and of the ‘external’ 
world of ‘objects’ from which it is supposedly cut off.) As Heidegger 
says, Descartes “takes the Being of ‘Dasein’ (to whose basic constitution 
Being-in-the-world belongs) in the very same way as he takes the Be-
ing of the res extensa—namely, as substance” (BT 131; Italics original). 
Heidegger, then, rejects any notion of a “self ” whose basic constitution 
is one of “thinking” or “consciousness.” Thus Heidegger, in his descrip-
tion of the incorrect traditional Western metaphysical picture of the “self,” 
writes, “The question of the ‘who’ answers itself in terms of the ‘I’ itself, 
the ‘subject,’ the ‘Self ’” (BT 150). For Heidegger, there is no ‘pure’ “I” or 
“ego” lying ‘behind’ the “self ’s” outwardly manifested actions.
In Heidegger’s view, Descartes’s metaphysical picture of the self-world re-
lation means that he cannot offer an accurate description of how human 
beings encounter situations in their everyday lives (HPK 85). Guignon 
puts this clearly when he describes Dilthey’s view, which was so influen-
tial for Heidegger, saying the “dualistic oppositions [of self and world] 
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are derivative from and parasitic on a more original kind of experience in 
which we exist as a ‘self-world’ unity. In our most familiar experiences, 
we are not aware of an ‘I’ or ‘self ’ distinct from what is experienced. The 
subject-object opposition of traditional epistemology is... a high-level 
theoretical abstraction with no relevance to understanding concrete life.”2
And for Heidegger, because any adequate picture of human beings must 
begin by looking at how they live in their everyday world (i.e., their 
everyday “dealings”) (BT 95), Descartes’s account cannot be correct. 
Contra Descartes, Heidegger claims that “Dasein itself—and this means 
also its Being-in-the-world—gets its ontological understanding of itself 
in the first instance from those entities which it itself is not but which it 
encounters ‘within’ its world, and from the Being which they possess” 
(BT 85; Italics original). As will become clear, Heidegger ascribes para-
mount importance to Dasein’s kind of Being as being “always already” 
situated within a contextual world of relations. Because it is important to 
recognize the full extent to which Heidegger’s view of Dasein as primarily 
relational and contextually situated emerges from his views regarding tra-
ditional epistemology, especially in its Cartesian form, I shall turn now to 
a basic sketch of some of the more fundamental features of his ontological 
project in Being and Time.
It is well known that Heidegger took the “question of Being” (BT 2) to 
be the most important—that is, most fundamental—question of all. He 
devoted his entire philosophical corpus to trying to answer the question: 
what is Being? The task of answering this question fell to what he called 
“fundamental ontology” (BT 34). Ontology is the study of Being in gen-
eral. Specifically, one can ask, “What is it to be rather than not be? The 
necessity of accounting for this question is seen, as Heidegger pointed 
out, when we ask ourselves: Why is there something—anything—rather 
than nothing? Human beings can ask such ontological questions. Onto-
logical investigation takes into its purview, then, the Being of “entities” 
(“das Seiende”). The ontic is a kind of investigation which studies proper-
ties and relations of particular “entities.” As Guignon puts it, the term 
“entities,” for Heidegger, “refers to anything of which we can say that ‘it 
is’ in any sense.... Symphonies, landscapes, thoughts, numbers, people, 
love, historical events: all of these are in some sense.”3 
For Heidegger, Being has a specific relation to entities. Namely, Being is 
the condition for the possibility of there being anything at all like enti-
ties, and of their being at all like the kind of entities they are. Being, 
Heidegger says, is “that which determines entities as entities, that on the 
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basis of which entities are already understood...” (BT 25-26). In his view, 
Being “determines” entities in that it defines their basic make-up, and it 
does so in a twofold sense: by both “that they are” (traditionally called 
‘existence’) and “what they are” (traditionally called ‘essence‘ (MH 93; 
Italics original).” As Polt describes it, “Being is what allows us to encoun-
ter every entity” (HI 41). Any inquiry into the question of Being, then, 
is one which seeks to find out what it is to be an ‘X’ for any particular 
type of X.” One could, for instance, inquire into the Being of a particular 
chair—in so far as it exemplifies “chairness”—just as readily as one could 
inquire into the Being of Winnie the Pooh, the honey-loving bear, or 
Macbeth, the tortured Prince. These entities form one of the two distinct 
kinds: nonhuman entities; Macbeth is, after all, a fictional character.4 The 
other distinct kind of entities is that of human beings, what Heidegger 
refers to as “Dasein” (literally “being-there,” or, more straightforwardly 
“being-here”).5 
Dasein is fundamentally distinctive from nonhuman entities in its ability 
to ask about the nature of its own Being. As Heidegger says, “Dasein is 
ontically distinctive in that it is ontological” (BT 32; Italics original); that 
is, “Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being—a rela-
tionship which itself is one of Being” (Ibid). In Heidegger’s view, “Dasein 
is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is 
ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an 
issue for it” (Ibid; Italics original). This means that in its everyday liv-
ing the question—or meaning—of Dasein’s Being arises for it. That for 
Dasein the meaning of its Being arises, or is an issue, for it is to say that 
its Being is something about which it cares. This feature of Dasein is what 
Heidegger calls “existence,” and he takes over this term from the original 
Latin “ex-sistere,” meaning “standing out.” Heidegger, in fact, conceives of 
such care as an ontological structure of Dasein: “[T]he Being of Dasein 
itself is to be made visible as care” (BT 83-84; Italics original).6 But enti-
ties such as chairs and cats, for instance, do not have the question of the 
quality of their Being show up for them as something about which they 
should care. 
Moreover, Heidegger says that “Dasein has turned out to be, more than 
any other entity, the one which must first be interrogated ontologically. 
But the roots of the existential analytic, on its part, are ultimately existen-
tiell, that is, ontical” (Ibid; Italics original). The “existential” / “existen-
tiell” distinction, for Heidegger, emerges in reference to kinds of under-
standing which Dasein exhibits. “Existential” understanding is a worked-
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out understanding “of the essential structures of Dasein” (HPK 68). 
“Existentiell” understanding pertains to the “characteristics of a unique 
individual” (Ibid). It refers to an individual’s understanding of how she is 
to live her life, which roles she should take up, etc. “Existential” under-
standing is revealed through ontological investigation, where the funda-
mental structure of Dasein’s Being become illuminated for me. Yet I can 
access understanding of these possible ways for me to be through ontical 
investigation and without having undertaken (the more primordial) onto-
logical investigation. 
Heidegger’s use of the term Dasein is intended to indicate, among other 
things, the “situatedness” (“Befindlichkeit”) of human beings. Heidegger 
ascribes paramount importance to human beings’ “situatedness” to under-
score the fact that we, as individual Dasein, are “always already” situated 
within a particular historical, cultural, socio-economic, etc. context in the 
world. (This is why Dasein should be understood more as “being-here” 
than as “being-there.”) His distinctive use of the double adverb “always 
already” is meant to highlight the fact that we are “thrown” into a world 
not of our own choosing. We are born in a particular time period, to 
particular parents, in a particular cultural, religious, etc. milieu. That is, 
we simply find ourselves in a given context ‘prior’ to our explicitly recog-
nizing it as such. But becoming aware of my “facticity”—e.g. that I am 
a white, middle-class male, born in Maryland, that I have one brother, 
etc.—enables me to understand myself in certain ways which themselves 
shape my “existentiell” understanding of the “factical” possible ways for 
me to be (i.e., the roles I can assume, etc.)—e.g. that I can assume the 
role of a supportive, or estranged, brother, that I can choose to own up 
to, or reject, the commitment I have made as a professional academic-in-
training, and that I can choose to accept that I am over thirty-years-old, 
or flee from that fact by acting out in adolescent ways. 
According to Heidegger, what enables me to become aware of my factic-
ity by way of “interpretation” is the “existential” characteristic of my 
Being as Dasein that he calls “understanding:” “As understanding, Dasein 
projects its Being upon possibilities” (BT 188). And “Interpretation is 
grounded existentially in understanding; the latter does not arise from 
the former” (Ibid). “Interpretation” is “the working-out of possibilities 
projected in understanding” (BT 188-189). 
In a very real sense, then, Dasein is “understanding,” to the extent that, as 
a particular case of Dasein, I instantiate, in my “interpretations,” various 
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modes of “taking a stand” with regard to my life. As he puts it, “Under-
standing is the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentiality-for-Being; and it 
is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its Being is capable 
of” (BT 182; Italics original). 
That we are always already enmeshed within a complex totality of in-
volvements—that we can never step out, so to speak, from the world in 
which we live—makes up a distinctive feature of Dasein’s Being; namely, 
that Dasein’s understanding of itself must be conceived primarily through 
its relations to itself, other Dasein, and the nonhuman entities Dasein en-
counters in its “Being-in-the-world.” He employs the hyphenation to em-
phasize that he conceives “the compound expression ‘Being-in-the-world’ 
as ‘a unitary phenomenon’” (BT 78; Italics original). Heidegger claims 
that such “relationality” is an ontological feature of Dasein—Dasein’s 
kind of Being is Being-in-the-world—which he describes with the terms 
“Being-in”7 and “Being-with.” He says explicitly that “‘Being-in’ is thus 
the formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-
the-world as its essential state. ‘Being alongside’ the world in the sense of 
being absorbed in the world...is an existentiale founded upon Being-in” 
(BT 80-81; Italics original). It is important to note, however, that “being 
alongside” is a misleading translation, and should be translated as “being 
always already in,” “being amidst,” or “being at home with” the world. 
My discussion above of the picture of Dasein’s “Being-in-the-world” 
which Heidegger offers elucidates the full extent to which, in our every-
day “concernful absorption” (BT 101) in our “dealings” in the world, 
we experience ourselves and the world not as Descartes’s picture would 
suggest, but rather as selves “always already” enmeshed within a world 
of involvements. As Guignon explains, Heidegger’s “description focuses 
not on the situations in which we are passive spectators, but rather on 
the contexts in which we are active and engaged in the world” (HPK 86). 
Guignon notes further that “In the picture that takes shape in Heidegger’s 
description of Being-in-the-world, there is no longer any way to draw a 
distinction between a subject and a set of objects that are to be known” 
(Ibid). 
Contrary to the traditional picture, the “who” of Dasein is in Heidegger’s 
view by definition non-isolatable. This is because “From the world 
[Dasein] takes its possibilities, and it does so first in accordance with the 
way things have been interpreted by the ‘they.’ This interpretation has 
already restricted the possible options of choice to what lies within the 
range of the familiar, the attainable, the respectable—that which is fitting 
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and proper” (BT 239). Heidegger uses the term “the ‘they’” (“Das Man”) 
to invoke those instances in which we refer to “what one typically does” 
when “one” is acting appropriately or properly, that is, in accordance with 
the norms and expectations of one’s society. When, for instance, I offer a 
purportedly justificatory explanation for prohibiting, say, “jaywalking,” I 
might say, “One does not do that,” in order to convey the sense of impro-
priety such an act would evince. 
Thus Heidegger uses the “they” to refer to all of us in general and each of 
us in particular as those who explicitly and implicitly sustain the norms 
for what is typically expected of us. The “they” is thus the sustainer and 
purveyor of general opinion. The “they” is the ‘ground,’ so to speak, on 
which the intelligibility of our social relations, values, beliefs, goals, pos-
sibilities, etc. rests. As a complex web of meanings, the “they” lets our 
enactment of our “existentiell” possibilities have the meaning they do. In 
this sense, the “they” is of indispensable importance to Dasein’s under-
standing of others and of itself (as being inextricably bound up in relation 
to others). We now see the full extent to which Heidegger claims the 
“they” bears on the “self ” such that the self can at no time ever disen-
tangle itself from the “they,” and stand, at it were, over and against it as 
an isolated individual self. In Heidegger’s view, we are always already both 
the “they-self ” and the “authentic self,” where the “they” and the “authen-
tic self ” are “existentialia” (i.e., ontological characteristics) of Dasein, not 
“existentiell” modes of being. This leads him to say, “For the most part 
I myself am not the ‘who’ of Dasein; the they-self is its ‘who’” (BT 312; 
Italics original). And, moreover, that “The Self...is proximally and for the 
most part inauthentic, the they-self ” (BT 225). 
I described earlier how, in Heidegger’s view, we are “thrown” into a world 
not of our own choosing. Because as everyday Dasein, we find ourselves 
always already “thrown” into a particular context pregnant with possibili-
ties for us to take up, as our “ownmost potentiality-for-Being” allows, 
we cannot ever ‘catch up’ and ‘get behind’ ourselves as everyday Dasein, 
whose Being is “Being-in-the-world,” such that we can view it sub specie 
aeternitatis. Heidegger captures this feature well when he says, “In no 
case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by this way in which things 
have been interpreted, set before the open country of a ‘world-in-itself ’ so 
that it just beholds what it encounters” (BT 213). Heidegger says further, 
“Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never existent before 
its basis, but only from it and as this basis. Thus ‘Being-a-basis’ means 
never to have power over one’s ownmost Being from the ground up” (BT 
330; Italics original). Heidegger is pointing to the fact that, as “thrown” 
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“Being-in-the-world,” we as individual Dasein find ourselves in a current 
of everyday life beginning from our birth, and, if we choose to, we can let 
ourselves remain entirely adrift and follow this current, which is com-
prised of the norms, routines, and conventions of public life. The quali-
fier “if we choose to” suggests, however, that there is a sense in which we 
can choose not to remain adrift. And this is indeed the case, according to 
Heidegger. Such a case involves our choosing definitively (but not unalter-
ably) to take a stand regarding our lives. 
But there is another sense in which we cannot ever not be adrift to some 
extent precisely because we are always already “thrown” into a world. 
Even if we choose to take a definitive stand of “anticipatory resoluteness” 
with regard to ourselves and our lives, such taking a stand does not mean 
that we have stepped out of the current in which we find ourselves. We 
cannot ever step out of the current and gain an irrevocably solid footing. 
As Dasein, the extent to which we let ourselves remain adrift is up to us. 
It is important to note, however, that the notion of “choosing” which 
I identified above must be understood whereby if we choose to remain 
adrift, then our choosing to do so is in fact a manner of choosing not to 
choose. 
This mode of being (noncontingently) adrift is what Heidegger calls “fall-
ing” (“verfallen”) (BT 210). As Heidegger says, “Being-in-the-world is 
always fallen (BT 225). That is, “Falling is a definite existential character-
istic of Dasein itself ” (BT 220). As Polt puts it, “falling is necessarily our 
normal, everyday mode of existing” (HI 76). Therefore we cannot not be 
in a state of “falling.” Having described “thrownness” above, it is now evi-
dent how, as Polt notes, “falling is so pervasive because it is a direct result 
of thrownness” (Ibid).8 Of falling, Heidegger says that, “This ‘absorption 
in...’ has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the ‘they’” 
(BT 220). 
For example, that I spend my weekdays working as a graduate student 
means that I assume the role of “graduate student,” with all of the expec-
tations and responsibilities that that entails. But the particular manner 
in which I take up such a role depends on how I understand myself as the 
kind of person who has such a role. Insofar as I am still a student, I could 
adopt the expectation “one” has of “students” by spending my time away 
from schoolwork by, say, drinking a lot of alcohol as a way of ‘cutting 
loose’ from the weight and pressure of my weekday responsibilities. While 
at the bar, I can engage in the kind of routine conversations “one” has at a 
bar, the ‘chit-chat’ (i.e., what Heidegger calls “idle talk”)9 that is expected 
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in such social settings. I can therefore quite readily let myself drift along 
with the routines of everyday life as such routines are established and un-
derstood in the specific social and historical milieu in which I live. In this 
way, I live my life according to how “one” in my situation lives “one’s” 
life. 
Heidegger’s description of “thrownness” and “falling” is meant to identify 
how each of us, as a particular case of Dasein in our everyday modes of 
“Being-in-the-world,” lets the “they”—of which we are a part—with its 
superficial ways of being and doing, obscure from us the insight that the 
“existentiell” possibilities of our everyday “Being-in-the-world” are in fact 
possibilities for living in a way radically different from how we have lived 
heretofore.10 One of the consequences, then, of letting ourselves remain 
adrift and be overtaken by, or delivered over to, the “they” is that we let 
ourselves overlook our possibilities as possibilities (BT 306). That we over-
look our possibilities as possibilities amounts to a leveling out of the con-
tours of our individual “ownmost potentiality-for-Being” of which our 
“existentiell” possibilities are a manifestation. In other words, our failure 
to see our possibilities as the possibilities they are for allowing us to take 
a stand toward ourselves and our lives means that we cover up and snuff 
out—although never altogether such that we cannot alter our course—
that which is most distinctive about us as particular cases of Dasein.11
That we can never not be in the states of “thrownness” and “fallenness” 
is what informs his claim that, even in becoming “authentic Being-one’s-
Self ” (BT 313) (as an “existentiell” mode), one is still a placeholder in 
the “they” (as an “existential”). That is, although we can be more or less 
authentic, all of us inexorably are, as an “existentiell” mode, part “they-
self.” I described earlier an example of the way in which I can let myself 
remain adrift in the “they.” And I noted how such a “remaining adrift” 
involved my choosing not to choose. Such a way of being is, in that case, 
one of disowning my choices and, ultimately, my responsibility. I noted, 
further, how the particular way in which I take up my role as a graduate 
student—as one among other contemporaneous roles I have—depends 
on how I see and understand myself with regard to my life as a whole. 
This helps illustrate how, for Heidegger, in becoming authentic, the 
change one makes is not in the “what” but in the “how.” For instance, my 
becoming “authentic Being-one’s-Self ” (Ibid) is not just a matter of sub-
stituting for my old set of actions a completely new set, such that I forego 
going out to the bar and drinking each weekend, although it may involve 
that. Rather, the change in becoming authentic would lie in my chang-
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ing the particular way in which I undertake those actions, such that my 
attitude toward them, and my understanding of their significance, takes 
on a radically different meaning. This is what Heidegger means when he 
says, “Authentic Being-one’s-Self takes the definite form of an existentiell 
modification of the ‘they’” (BT 312). But he is careful to note that, just 
because I may become authentic, it is just as possible for me to become 
less and less authentic, possibly to such an extent that I drift back entirely 
into the “publicness of the they” (BT 220) and into authenticity. 
It has frequently been argued that Heidegger does not regard Dasein’s 
“existential” “falling” as deserving of moral disapprobation (or, for that 
matter, of the “anticipatory resoluteness” of authenticity as deserving of 
moral approbation). On this view, his use of the notion of “inauthentic-
ity” is especially confusing at first glance, for the terms “authentic” and 
“inauthentic” for us in English typically have a moral or ethical con-
notation insofar as they reflect a value judgment. But upon considering 
that the German words Heidegger uses for “authentic,” “eigentlich,” and 
“inauthentic,” “Uneigenlichkeit,” are derived from “eigen” meaning “own,” 
then we get a better sense of how his notion of authenticity should be un-
derstood; namely, as Guignon suggests, as “enownment.”12 Nevertheless, 
as Mark Wrathall has noted, “It is implausible to deny that authenticity is 
at least sometimes used in an evaluative sense. Taylor Carman suggests…
that Heidegger actually has two distinct notions running side by side—a 
descriptive and a normative sense of ‘authentic.’”13
Heidegger as Dialogist: “Being-with,” “Discourse,” and “Solicitude” 
Heidegger’s conception of “Being-with” illustrates, in part, how he en-
dorses, albeit tacitly, a conception of the dialogical in Being and Time. In 
Paragraph 26, he writes: 
“According to the analysis which we have now completed, Being 
with Others belongs to the Be- ing of Dasein, which is an issue 
for Dasein in its very Being. Thus as Being-with, Dasein ‘is’ es- 
sentially for the sake of Others…. Even if the particular factical 
Dasein does not turn to Others, and supposes that it has no need 
of them or manages to get along without them, it is in the way of 
Being-with” (BT 160; Italics original). 
This passage describes how Dasein’s Being-with others is an ontological, 
non-contingent feature of its existence. As Heidegger’s description above, 
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along with those he offers of the They, emphasizes, as individual Dasein, 
we cannot, as it were, escape being-with others. The social world is so 
pervasive, then, that it is only in theoretical abstraction from our everyday 
lives that we can consider ourselves as an isolatable individual, and even 
when doing so, it is always already from a standpoint situated in a social 
world of others. As Charles Taylor puts it, “One is a self only among 
other selves. A self can never be described without reference to those who 
surround it” (SS 35). This is what Taylor refers to as the “transcendental 
condition of interlocution” (SS 38-39). He describes the Levinasian view 
when he writes in Sources of the Self: 
“The close connection between identity and interlocution also 
emerges in the place of names in human life. My name is what I 
am ‘called.’ A human being has to have a name, because he or she 
has to be called, i.e., addressed. Being called into conversation is a 
precondition of developing a human identity, and so my name is 
(usually) given me by my earliest interlocutors” (SS 525, endnote 
13; italics original). 
Our sociality is so comprehensive, though, that, as Heidegger points out, 
even when we are alone, we are not somehow removed from the condi-
tion—or the way or manner—of “Being-with” others. Thus Heidegger as-
serts, “Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when fac-
tically no other is present-at-hand or perceived” (BT 156). He describes 
this further by saying, “Being missing and ‘Being away’ [Das fehlen und 
‘Fortsein’] are modes of Dasein-with, and are possible only because Dasein 
as Being-with lets the Dasein of Others be encountered in its world” (BT 
157). Thus, William Blattner accurately claims, “Even…if one is a hermit 
or recluse, having retreated to a cabin in the hills of Idaho to get away 
from everyone, others matter to one, in this case, as being despicable or to 
be avoided. Being a recluse is an anti-social way of understanding oneself 
and one’s relations to others. Being anti-social is a ‘privative’ way of being 
social; it is a stance on the significance of what others pursue.”14 
Heidegger’s descriptions of “thrownness,” “falling,” “Being-with,” the 
“they,” and “discourse,” among other central notions in Being and Time, 
show how we are born into a language community of interlocutors—
a “we”—and we develop our identity as an “I” only by virtue of, not 
separate from, the shared practices, evaluations, and articulations of 
social interaction.15 Blattner calls Heidegger’s position here “ontological 
communitarianism” to underscore how Heidegger wants to avoid any 
notion of an ethical or political communitarianism (HBT 68). Echoing 
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Heidegger, Taylor argues that “There is no way we could be inducted 
into personhood except by being initiated into a language” (SS 35), or as 
Heidegger refers to it, “discourse,” which is the condition for the possibil-
ity of “language.” 
Discourse, for Heidegger, does not refer to speech as verbal utterance. 
Rather, as Richard Polt suggests, “Heidegger describes discourse (rather 
vaguely) as the articulation and expression of” the world’s intelligibil-
ity.… “Discourse makes it possible for me to share my situation with oth-
ers in language.”16  Thus Heidegger claims that “As an existential state in 
which Dasein is disclosed, discourse is constitutive for Dasein’s existence. 
Hearing and keeping silent [Schweigen] are possibilities belonging to dis-
cursive speech” (BT 204). Indeed, Heidegger’s differentiation of “commu-
nication”—in which, in one form, interlocutors merely “make assertions” 
or “giv[e] information” (BT 205)—from discourse suggests he is aware of 
the qualitative distinction between dialogical and monological interlocu-
tion, where “communication” is a strictly monological phenomenon.17
Discourse in general and language in particular (as Heidegger distin-
guishes them) play an indispensable role, then, in the formation of hu-
man identity. In sharing “webs of interlocution” (SS 36), Taylor claims, I 
articulate my identity as “an answer to the question of who I am through 
a definition of where I am speaking from and to whom” (Ibid). My 
identity comes to be constituted through my interaction with others, by 
what “stances” I take towards them, and how I respond to the stances 
they assume towards me. As Taylor notes, “[O]ur identity is never simply 
defined in terms of our individual properties. If I really identify myself 
with my deferential attitude toward wiser people like you, then this con-
versational stance becomes a constituent of my identity.”18
If the picture I have drawn of Heidegger so far is accurate, then his 
descriptions of the ontological features of Dasein’s Being-with others 
illustrate how human beings, in their everyday discursive comportment 
with one another, are mutually solicitous of one another, irrespective of 
the attitudinal stance they may actually adopt. That is, human beings, as 
discursive agents amongst fellow interlocutors, find themselves perpetu-
ally called upon and addressed by others and themselves. We find ourselves 
situated within human discourse in such a way that we are always already 
both addressers and addressees. (This particular aspect of solicitousness 
is one which came to feature so centrally for Levinas and one which he 
captured so powerfully.) I think this is precisely what Heidegger has in 
mind when he says that, “As a Being-in-the-world with Others, a Being 
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which understands, Dasein is ‘in thrall’ to Dasein-with and to itself; and in 
this thralldom it ‘belongs’ to these” (BT 206; Italics mine). The solicitous 
pull we feel from others—our sense of being called upon or addressed 
by others—is coeval with the outward-directed anticipation we have, 
noncontingently, toward others—our sense of calling upon others. The 
pull we feel from others would not arise, then, without the anticipatory 
outward-looking orientation we have as one of our ontological features. 
The ontological feature of outward-looking anticipation is precisely what 
Heidegger is describing when he says both that “Dasein ‘is’ essentially 
for the sake of Others” (BT 160; Italics mine). That this outward-looking 
other-directedness is an essential feature of ourselves as particular cases of 
Dasein means that it is an ineluctable feature of our sociality, “it is in the 
way of Being-with,” that is, it is our very mode of Being-in-the-world. 
Even though this other-directedness is an ontological feature of our 
existence, as Heidegger emphasizes, this does not preclude our ontically 
choosing to ignore or remain impervious to the pull or call of others. 
Indeed, as Heidegger insists in his description of everyday inauthentic 
“falling,” our normal mode of going about our daily lives is precisely this 
(ontic) avoidance of the pull or call of others. Moreover, as I shall show in 
greater detail later, our choice to remain impervious to the pull or call of 
others exemplifies monological action. 
Heidegger captures the different modes of our discursive comportment in 
his conception of “solicitude.” The normative dimension we find in Hei-
degger’s notion of authenticity is present as well in both “solicitude” and 
“care” (Sorge), with the latter forming the basis from which Heidegger 
derives his conception of the former. Blattner offers a clear description 
of these notions: “Simply in so far as Dasein is being-in-the-world, it is 
also being-with, and simply in so far as its own life matters to it, the lives 
of others matter to it…. Heidegger calls this mattering ‘care,’ and others’ 
mattering to me he calls ‘solicitude’ (Fursorge, literally ‘caring-for’). It is 
important to bear in mind that just as ‘care’ does not refer to a specific 
emotional state, such as worry or devotion, neither does ‘solicitude.’ ‘So-
licitude’ is just a technical term for the way others matter to us simply in 
so far as we lead our own lives” (HBT 67).
Consider the following two passages, the second of which is especially 
illuminating for my purposes. Heidegger writes: 
“[T]hose entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports 
itself do not have the kind of Be ing which belongs to equipment 
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ready-to-hand; they are themselves Dasein. These entities are 
not objects of concern, but rather of solicitude” (BT 157; Italics 
original).
and
“[W]e understand the expression ‘solicitude’ in a way which 
corresponds to our use of ‘concern’ as a term for an existentiale. 
For example, ‘welfare work’ [“Fursorge”], as a factical social ar-
rangement, is grounded in Dasein’s state of Being as Being-with. 
Its factical urgency gets its motivation in that Dasein maintains 
itself proximally and for the most part in the deficient modes of 
solicitude. Being for, against, or without one another, passing one 
another by, not ‘mattering’ to one another—these are possible ways 
of solicitude. And it is precisely these last-named defi- cient and 
Indifferent modes that characterize everyday, average Being-with-
one-another” (BT 158; Italics mine). 
These passages show that Heidegger understands “solicitude” as an on-
tological structure of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Further, that Hei-
degger speaks here of “deficient”—and elsewhere of “positive”—modes 
of “solicitude” illustrates how he tacitly holds a normative conception of 
solicitude. In identifying the deficient and positive modes of solicitude, 
Heidegger clearly seems to be offering a description of the ways that indi-
vidual Dasein can fail or succeed as discursive selves or agents, although 
he of course omits any talk of “agents” per se. That is, he seems to suggest 
that we can be better or worse at comporting ourselves discursively with 
others, we can be more or less attuned to others. As he says, “solicitude is 
guided by considerateness and forbearance. Like solicitude, these can range 
through their respective deficient and Indifferent modes up to the point 
of inconsiderateness or the perfunctoriness for which indifference leads 
the way” (BT 159; Italics original). Thus, for Heidegger, solicitude marks 
one’s modes of “opening oneself up [Sichoffenbaren] or closing oneself off” 
(BT 161). Only through solicitude can the “disclosure of the Other” arise 
at all (Ibid).19
The deficient modes of solicitude—“passing one another by” and “not 
‘mattering’ to one another”—describe, I think, the way that we can fail to 
heed and appropriately respond to the solicitous pull of others by clos-
ing ourselves off from and making ourselves unavailable to others. These 
deficient (monological) modes thus account for the ways that we can be 
impervious to the call of others’ addresses to us. 
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The “positive modes” of solicitude have “two extreme possibilities”: 
“leap[ing] in” for the other and “leap[ing] ahead” of the other (BT 158). 
Solicitude, as Heidegger writes, 
“can, as it were, take away ‘care’ from the Other and put itself in 
his position in concern: it can leap in for him. This kind of so-
licitude takes over for the Other that with which he is to concern 
himself. The Other is thus thrown out of his own position; he 
steps back so that afterwards, when the matter has been attended 
to, he can either take it over as something finished and at his 
dispos- al, or disburden himself of it completely” (BT 158; Italics 
original). 
Heidegger continues to say,
“In contrast to this, there is also the possibility of a kind of solici-
tude which does not so much leap in for the Other as leap ahead 
of him [ihm vorausspringt] in his exisentiell potentiality-for- Be-
ing, not in order to take away his ‘care’ but rather to give it back 
to him authentically as such for the first time” (BT 158-159; 
Italics original). 
Heidegger’s statements about solicitude—in both its positive and defi-
cient modes—show that it is dialogical in character. The deficient modes 
of solicitude represent, however, a failure to fulfill the dialogical potential 
inherent in the phenomenon of solicitude, and thus amount only to 
monological action. It should be unsurprising that the “deficient” modes 
of solicitude fail to live up to the dialogical potential inherent in solici-
tude. But based on his description of “leaping in” for the other, contra 
Heidegger’s implicit suggestion, this “positive” mode seems monological 
in character as well, as it involves Dasein acting without regard for the 
interlocutory partner’s agency which makes the to-and-fro of mutual 
reciprocity possible in the first place. In “tak[ing] over for the Other” 
whereby “[t]he Other is thus thrown out of his own position,” Dasein in 
fact remains impervious to the to-and-fro movement constitutive, in part, 
of the dialogical. Thus, I want to suggest, it is only in the positive mode 
of “leap[ing] ahead” of the other that the dialogical potential in solicitude 
gets fulfilled.
Dasein’s fallenness in the “they” is the reason why average, everyday 
Dasein is ignorant of and impervious to the dialogical character of 
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Being-with and solicitude, and thus “proximally and for the most part” 
comports itself monologically, even if at times it can appear otherwise. 
As Heidegger says, “Being-with-one-another in the ‘they’ is by no means 
an indifferent side-by-sideness in which everything has been settled, but 
rather an intent, ambiguous watching of one another, a secret and recip-
rocal listening-in. Under the mask of ‘for-one-another,’ an ‘against-one-
another’ is in play” (BT 219). Notwith-standing Dasein’s appearing to 
comport itself dialogically, its fallenness in and conformity to the “they” 
renders it impervious to the dialogical potential of discursive Being-with. 
“[T]he ‘they’ presents every judgment and decision as its own, it deprives 
the particular Dasein of its answerability” (BT 165), Heidegger says. 
Heidegger describes what the authentic fulfillment of such dialogical 
comportment entails when he writes, 
“Proximally Dasein is ‘they,’ and for the most part it remains so. 
If Dasein discovers the world in its own way [eigens] and brings 
it close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic Being, then this 
discovery of the ‘world’ and this disclosure of Dasein are always 
accomplished as a clearing- away of concealments and obscuri-
ties, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its 
own way” (BT 167). 
Only in the positive mode of solicitude as “leap[ing] ahead” of the other 
does “Dasein discove[r] the world in its own way and brin[g] it close” 
(Ibid) authentically. Such solicitude entails Dasein acknowledging and 
heeding, most often tacitly, the dialogical character of Dasein’s Being-
with.
If the picture of Heidegger as a dialogist in Being and Time is accurate, 
there still seems to be at least one pressing issue that requires address. 
Namely, is the “call of conscience,” as an integral part of the apparently 
individualizing moment of authenticity, truly dialogical? Heidegger’s 
conception of the “call of conscience” is arguably one of his most obscure 
in all of Being and Time, lending itself rather easily to mis-interpretations 
which take it as nothing less than mystical. The call of conscience emerg-
es, in Heidegger’s view, as a response to Dasein’s feeling of “being-guilty.” 
Facing up to this feeling of being-guilty is what Heidegger refers to as 
“resoluteness.” “By ‘resoluteness’ we mean ‘letting oneself be called forth 
to one’s ownmost Being-guilty,’” (BT 353; Italics original), Heidegger 
writes. Heidegger’s conception of the call of conscience is arguably one 
of his most obscure in all of Being and Time because even his use of the 
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terms “conscience” and “guilt,” as Blattner has pointed out, is misleading. 
In using the term “conscience,” Heidegger is not describing the ordinary 
ethical conception we have in which conscience refers to the experience of 
feeling remorse about some past action or course of events. Heidegger in 
fact does not understand “conscience” or “guilt” in moral terms; they lie 
outside of morality altogether. Rather, by “conscience,” Heidegger refers 
to the ontological condition for the ontic possibility of anything like our 
ordinary conception of conscience to arise at all. As Taylor Carman puts 
it, “[J]ust as existential death and guilt are hermeneutic conditions of our 
ordinary concepts of death and guilt, so too conscience in the existential 
sense is what makes possible our ordinary ethical notions of conscience 
and conscientiousness” (HA 292).
Heidegger makes it clear that the “call” “is a mode of discourse” (BT 
314; Italics original) and thus has a discursive structure: the “call” (Ruf) 
issues from Dasein’s ownmost possibility and its “uncanny” “authentic 
Being-one’s-Self.” The “call” is issued to the “they-self.” That is, the call of 
conscience addresses us in our everyday inauthentic mode of going along 
with the “they.” Thus Heidegger says, “Conscience summons Dasein’s 
Self from its lostness in the ‘they’” (BT 319). Even though “calling” is a 
mode of discourse, and the “call” addresses and summons us, the “call” 
itself should not be understood as the issuing of a “vocal utterance” (BT 
316). Not only is “vocal utterance” “not essential for discourse, and 
therefore not for the call either” (Ibid), but authentic “discourse” is, in his 
view, “silence.” This is why Heidegger uses scare quotes around “voice” 
(Stimme) (BT 313). Indeed, he explicitly says, “Conscience discourses solely 
and constantly in the mode of keeping silent” (BT 318; Italics original). 
Nevertheless, “conscience” has a “disclosive” character, in that it “gives us 
‘something’ to understand” (BT 314).
Somewhat strangely, this means that that which the “call” is “about”—
i.e., what gets ‘said’ in the “call”—is “nothing,” understood as ‘no-thing’ 
(BT 318). As Carman notes, “The call has no determinate propositional 
content” (HA 293). “Nothing” gets ‘said’ in the “call” because of the 
indefinite nature of Dasein’s “Being-guilty.” Heidegger conceives of 
“guilty” (“Schuld,” meaning “debt”) as a kind of “indebtedness.”20 But this 
“indebtedness” describes neither some definite “factical” possibility nor 
an “existentiell” mode which Dasein should, but has failed to, take up. It 
is not as if Dasein’s “guilt” is somehow a result of its not having chosen 
the ‘right’ projection over and against other possible ones. The indefinite-
ness of Dasein’s “Being-guilty” lies, rather, in a general and indeterminate 
sense of having come up short with respect to one’s life as a whole. What 
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we ‘hear’ in the call of conscience is a kind of existential guilt wherein 
we realize that we are not being all that we can be. Further, what makes 
the call of conscience possible is Dasein’s Being as Care—that is, that in 
Dasein’s Being, its “Being is an issue for it” (BT 32; Italics original), it is 
that about which Dasein cares. Thus Heidegger says, “Conscience is the 
call of care from the uncanniness of Being-in-the-world—the call which 
summons Dasein to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-guilty” (BT 323). 
21 “Conscience,” then, motivates us to recognize and to understand nor-
matively the fact that we have our own life to live. 
It is clear that, in Heidegger’s view, “conscience” has a character of “mine-
ness.” He describes the “mineness” of “conscience” when he says that “the 
call...comes from” the “uncanniness of thrown individualization” (BT 
325; Italics original). But, interestingly, he says that the “caller” is “‘no-
body,’” in the sense, I think, of ‘nobody in particular’ (BT 323). And, 
moreover, that “The caller is, to be sure, indefinite; but the ‘whence’ 
from which it calls does not remain a matter of indifference for the call-
ing. This ‘whence’—the uncanniness of thrown individualization—gets 
called too [mitgerufen] in the calling; that is, it too gets disclosed [mi-
terschlossen]. In calling forth to something, the ‘whence’ of the calling 
is the ‘whither’ to which we are called back” (BT 325-326). It is evident 
here that the call of conscience is issued from me to me, or, as Heidegger 
says, “The call comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me” (BT 
320; Italics original). “The call of conscience,” Heidegger writes, “has 
the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost poten-
tiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of summoning it to its 
ownmost Being-guilty” (BT 314; Italics original). In its “appeal” and its 
“summoning,” the call of conscience attests to the presence of Dasein’s 
“ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self ” as the possibility Dasein has of 
becoming “authentic Being-one’s-Self.” What gets expressed in the call of 
conscience, then, is the identifiable difference between on the one hand 
Dasein’s inauthentic self and on the other its authentic self, or its “own-
most potentiality-for-Being-its-Self.” The call of conscience is therefore an 
abrupt arousal from Dasein’s having had its authentic voice drowned out 
by the voice of the they.
That the call of conscience is discursive does not mean, however, that it 
assumes the form of typical kinds of discourse. As Carman writes, “[C]
onscience does not literally have the structure of dialogue or conversa-
tion, or even of inner monologue, for the voice of conscience does not in 
fact articulate any definite interpretation of anything” (HA 294). The call 
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of conscience does not involve Dasein’s talking to itself in any way. And 
there is no ontological to-and-fro structure characteristic of dialogue or 
conversation. This would seem to suggest that the call itself is monologi-
cal. Such a conclusion would be a mistake, though, for it would overlook 
the dispositional stance required for the call of conscience to summon 
Dasein in the first place. In fact, the call of conscience involves Dasein’s 
having adopted the same dialogical attitudinal stance as mentioned 
earlier: “When Dasein understandingly lets itself be called forth to this 
possibility, this includes its becoming free for the call—its readiness for the 
potentiality of getting appealed to. In understanding the call, Dasein is in 
thrall to [horig] its ownmost possibility of existence. It has chosen itself ” (BT 
334; Italics original). 
Conclusion
I want to conclude, in part, by noting two important aspects to keep in 
mind for my claim that Heidegger is a dialogist. First, I am not claiming 
that he offers an explicit theory of dialogue. Nor am I claiming, secondly, 
that he identifies explicitly a sense of to-and-fro movement between 
interlocutors. I noted earlier that Heidegger endorses a notion of the 
to-and-fro because he does offer descriptions of the dynamics of inter-
locution which affirm tacitly a conceptual awareness of such back and 
forth movement. We find such descriptions in his discussion of “listening 
to,” “hearing,” and “keeping silent” (BT 206-208). Heidegger writes, for 
instance, that 
“Keeping silent is another essential possibility of discourse, and 
it has the same existential found- ation. In talking with one 
another, the person who keeps silent can ‘make one understand’ 
(that is, he can develop an understanding), and he can do so 
more authentically than the person who is never short of words. 
Speaking at length [Viel-sprechen] about something does not offer 
the slightest guarantee that thereby understanding is advanced. 
On the contrary, talking extensively about something, covers it 
up and brings what is understood to a sham clarity—the unintel-
ligibili- ty of the trivial” (BT 208; Italics original). 
Heidegger is correct to note that just because an interlocutor does not 
remain silent does not mean she is acting with appropriate sensitivity 
to the to-and-fro of dialogue or conversation. It may be that precisely 
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in remaining silent the interlocutor is responding with the appropriate 
sensitivity and receptivity to her interlocutory partner. Conversely, it 
may be that the talkative interlocutor is the one insensitive to the par-
ticular circumstantial context of the dialogue or conversation. He may 
do so unconscious of his motives, but more often than not, it seems, as 
Heidegger emphasizes, such talkativeness is undertaken precisely to cover 
up or smooth over any latent possibilities of deeper, more meaningful 
understanding. As an illuminating example, one need only recall Tolstoy’s 
description of the behavior of Ivan Ilych’s colleagues and wife at his fu-
neral.22 Tolstoy’s depiction there accurately captures, I think, an instance 
of what Heidegger calls “idle talk.” Idle talk, then, is a case in which most 
of the necessary conditions for dialogicality enumerated at the outset of 
this paper would be successfully met, yet it would still fail to be dialogical 
because it would fail to meet the condition of address and responsibil-
ity, that is, it would be an instance of the interlocutors failing to have the 
proper interlocutory attitude necessary for achieving dialogicality. 
At least one further question remains, though. If all of the necessary con-
ditions for dialogicality are met in a given interaction, does that guarantee 
that the interaction is an instance of authentic action, as Heidegger un-
derstands authenticity? I do not think so. This shows an important aspect 
of the relation between dialogicality and authenticity within the context 
I have described. I want to suggest that authentic action would necessar-
ily be dialogical, but dialogical action would not necessarily guarantee 
authenticity. Though a full-fledged discussion of this is more appropriate 
for another study, I think it is plausible to suggest that this would be due 
to the lofty criteria that Heidegger has in mind when he discusses authen-
ticity, criteria that most people never fulfill. 
These caveats notwithstanding, Heidegger’s notions of Being-with, dis-
course, and solicitude indicate the dialogical nature of his thought: 1) the 
dynamics of language, as the way in which discourse gets expressed, are 
inherently unfinalizable or open-ended; 2) such dynamics require em-
bodiment and 3) interlocution; 4) they entail address and responsibility; 
5) the various modes of solicitude have a normative dimension illustrative 
of the dialogical; 6) simultaneous with the recognition of address is the 
recognition of a sense of a solicitous pull from or call by others; and lastly, 
7) a recognition, albeit tacit, of the to-and-fro of interlocution.
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Notes
1 See Guignon’s descriptions of these issues in Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge. 
(Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1983), esp. Chapter 3, pp. 
85-145. I shall abbreviate this hereafter as HPK.
2 Guignon, “What is Hermeneutics?, in Re-envisioning Psychology: Moral Dimensions of 
Theory and Practice. Frank C. Richardson, Blaine J. Fowers, Charles B. Guignon. (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1999).
3 Guignon, “Martin Heidegger: Being and Time,” in Central Works of Philosophy, 4. Edited 
by John Shand. (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006). Italics in the original. 
I shall hereafter abbreviate this as MH.
4 Such nonhuman entities constitute a “what,” and Heidegger uses the term “Reality” to 
designate them.
5See Daniel Dahlstrom’s The Heidegger Dictionary. (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013).
6 Heidegger uses the word “Care” (“Sorge”) as a technical term throughout Being and 
Time. For my purposes here, however, I shall not offer a detailed discussion it. See Being 
and Time, Division I, Chapter VI, titled “Care as the Being of Dasein,” p. 225. To give a 
sense of the paramountcy which Heidegger gives it, I cite the following remarks: “Care, as 
a primordial structural totality, lies ‘before’ [‘vor’] every factical ‘attitude and ‘situation’ of 
Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori...” (BT 238; italics original). And: “Being-in-
the-world is essentially care” (BT 237).
7 “Being-in” as an “existential” of Dasein should not be understood as a “Being-in-
something” in the sense that we would mean it when we say that “water is ‘in’ the glass,” 
as such a “Being-in-something” is proper only to the kind of Being of entities, not Dasein 
(BT 79). Such a notion of “insideness” as that designated in the expression “the water is in 
the glass” applies strictly to things “present-at-hand” (BT 82), where the “water” and the 
“glass” are entities or things (BT 79). They “have the same kind of Being--that of Being-
present-at-hand--as Things occurring ‘within’ the world” (Ibid). Simply, only those ‘things’ 
which Descartes called “substances” have the kind of Being of “present-at-hand.” See also 
Dreyfus (1990, esp. Chapter Three) and Blattner (2006, p.42).
8 Heidegger in fact places these two features together, as he titles § 38 “Falling and 
Thrownness.” See Being and Time, p. 219.
9 See Being and Time, p. 211 for the beginning of § 35, entitled “Idle Talk.”
10 It obscures from us also the fundamental structure of Dasein. This can be addressed 
only through fundamental ontology—the kind which Heidegger undertakes.
11 Heidegger cautions, however, that such “falling” “does not express any negative evalu-
ation” as if “we were to ascribe to it the sense of a bad and deplorable ontical property of 
which, perhaps, more advanced stages of human culture might be able to rid themselves” 
(BT 220).
12 See “Achieving Personhood,” p. 14, for Guignon’s claims regarding this. Specifically, he 
notes that “authenticity” should be understood as connoting that which is “most proper.”
13 See Wrathall’s paper “‘Demanding Authenticity of Ourselves’: Heidegger on Authen-
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ticity as an Extra-moral Ideal,” from the Proceedings of the 48th Annual Meeting of the 
Heidegger Circle, p. 154, n. 7. Wrathall is referring to Carman’s Heidegger’s Analytic (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 271. I shall hereafter abbreviate Heidegger’s 
Analytic as HA.
14 William Blattner, Heidegger’s Being and Time: A Reader’s Guide. (New York: Con-
tinuum      Press, 2006), p. 67. I shall hereafter abbreviate this as HBT. See also Theodore 
R. Schatzki’s “Early Heidegger on Sociality,” from A Companion to Heidegger (Blackwell 
Companions to Philosophy, Vol. 29). Ed. by Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall. 
Schatzki’s discussion is thematically similar to mine, but our respective interpretations 
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